A PERSONAL NOTE ON TRADEMARK
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW
BEFORE THE LANHAM ACT
MILTON HANDLER*

I was first exposed to antitrust and trademarks in the 1926 term of the
United States Supreme Court, when I served as law clerk to Justice Stone. I
had studied neither subject while at law school, a remarkable deficiency in my
education having regard for the fact that both subjects were the centerpiece of
my teaching, which extended for some forty-five years, and my practice over a
period of some seventy years. The Court that term decided two trademark and
1
unfair competition cases, with both opinions written by Justice Holmes. I
doubt whether these opinions alone would have sufficiently kindled my interest
to lead me to devote my entire adult life to these subjects. What aroused my
interest was the conversation about trademarks between Justices Stone and
Holmes at which I was present. Holmes's tribute to Frank Schechter's The
Historical Foundations of the Law Relating to Trade-Marks' induced me to
immerse myself in this subject. I discovered that the first trademark case to be
litigated in the federal courts was as late as 1844, over 100 years before the
enactment of the Lanham Act.' The paucity of reported decisions made it
possible for a neophyte to read all of the court opinions, which I did when I
joined the Columbia faculty in 1927. What I found was rather disconcerting;
valuable brands of immense commercial magnetism were not accorded
trademark status because of their etymological inferiority, despite the fact that
they identified the source of the goods upon which they were affixed.
Waterman Fountain Pens, Waltham Watches, and Kellogg Corn Flakes were
trade names, not trademarks, and in theory (but not necessarily in fact)
accorded limited and inadequate protection. At Columbia, my mentor,
Professor Herman Oliphant, who pioneered the field with the first published
casebook on trade regulation and who introduced the subject as a separate
course in the law school curriculum, invited me to teach it notwithstanding my
total unfamiliarity with the subject. He also encouraged me to put out a revised
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edition of his casebook. As antitrust was in the doldrums during the Coolidge
and Hoover Administrations, I concentrated my research on trademarks and
unfair competition.
Three decisions of Justice Holmes, two of which, as indicated, were handed
down during the 1926 term, illustrated the primitive condition of these branches
of the law and epitomized the need for reform.
In Waterman Co. v. Modern Pen Co.,' the Court affirmed a decree that

restricted the defendant to using the name Arthur A. Waterman & Co. instead
of A. A. Waterman & Co. In addition, the court required the words "not
connected with the L. E. Waterman Co." to be juxtaposed in equally large and
conspicuous letters when the permitted name was marked upon any part of the
fountain pen sold by the defendant or upon boxes containing such pens, and
whenever the name was used by way of advertisement or otherwise to denote
any fountain pens made or sold by the defendant or to denote that it was the
maker or seller of such pens.5
The Court thus permitted the use of the Waterman name as a means of
identifying the source of defendant's product, relying upon the qualified use to
protect the plaintiff's good will and to prevent consumer confusion.6 How
many prospective purchasers of fountain pens knew that the initials of the
manufacturer of the genuine pens were L. E. or that the initials of the maker
of the spurious product were A. A. or that his first name was Arthur? Was this
an effective way to prevent confusion of source or deception of the consumer?
In Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P Lorillard Co.,' the Beech-Nut Packing

Company, owner of the Beech-Nut trademark used on ham, bacon, chewing
gum, peanut butter, ginger ale, and other food products, sued to prevent the
Lorillard Company from using "Beech-Nut" on chewing tobacco and cigarettes. 8 Certiorari was granted to determine the extent to which, if at all,
trademark protection is to be accorded against the use of the same trademark
by a different company on an unrelated product. The case was argued by
Charles Evans Hughes, then at the bar, for the plaintiff and by John W Davis
for the defendant. The issue was fully briefed and extensively argued by these
two icons of the appellate bar. Everyone who was anyone in Washington
attended the oral argument, and the Court's ruling was awaited with intense
anticipation. Justice Holmes felt that the issue, which has perplexed the courts
before and since the enactment of the Lanham Act, need not be decided
because he concluded that the Lorillard Company, which traced its ownership
of its Beech-Nut brand back to its usage before the American Tobacco

4. 235 U.S. 88 (1914).

5. Id. at 93.
6. Justice Pitney in dissent described defendant's use of the Waterman name as a "sham and a
fraudulent device." Id. at 98 (Pitney, J., dissenting).
7. 273 U.S. 629 (1926).
8. Id. at 630.
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Company antitrust decree, had not expressly abandoned the mark.9 He ruled
that "the mere lapse of time was not such that it could be said to have
destroyed the right as matter of law."' Hence, he held that Lorillard could
not be restrained from reusing a mark that had been dormant, but not
abandoned.
In Mosler Safe Co. v. Ely-Norris Safe Co., the Mosler Company, claiming
to be the only manufacturer of safes containing an explosion chamber for
protection against burglary, sought an injunction to prevent the defendant from
falsely representing that its safes contained an explosion chamber. 2 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, disagreeing with the
Sixth Circuit's authoritative ruling in American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg.
Co.,' 3 reversed the district court, which had denied an injunction. 4 Holmes
found consistent with both the allegations in the complaint and the admission
by defendant in its arguments, that there were other safes with explosion
chambers besides the one manufactured by the plaintiff. 5 Assuming the
defendant's representation that its safe had an explosion chamber was false, the
Court concluded "there is nothing to show that customers had they known the
facts would have gone to the plaintiff rather than to other competitors in the
market, or to lay a foundation for a claim for loss of sales." 6 In other words,
the Court sustained the rule of the Washboard case that a competitor cannot
challenge the false advertising of a rival and, thus, claim injury flowing from the
defendant's misrepresentation unless it is a monopoly. Since there are,
thankfully, few monopolies, false advertising could not be restrained by
competitors who truthfully marketed their products and who alone would have
the incentive to bring suit.
Waterman indicated the need for an analysis and synthesis of the common
law of trademarks, Mosler for adequate protection of tradesmen and consumers
against false and misleading advertising, and Beech-Nut for a workable rationale
for the protection of valuable brands beyond the precise boundaries of the area
of their exploitation. It is curious that the founder of legal realism, who
emphasized the overriding importance of experience, should have relied on
precedent and a rigorous reading of the pleadings while ignoring the practical
effects of his rulings.

9. Id. at 631-32.
10. Id. at 632.
11. 273 U.S. 132 (1926).
12. Id.
13. 103 F. 281 (1900). The Washboard decision was by a Court consisting of Judges Taft, Lurton,
and Day, all subsequent members of the Supreme Court.
14. Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1925).
15. Mosler Safe, 273 U.S. at 134.
16. Id.
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I addressed these problems in a series of articles and in my participation in
the First and Second Restatements of Torts.17 I also devoted a major part of
my casebook 8 to unfair competition and the various competitive torts.
In a 1930 article, Trade Marks and Trade Names-Analysis and Synthesis,19
Charles Pickett and I deplored the treatment accorded valuable brands that
were not arbitrary, fictitious, or coined but rather descriptive. Those brands
that were merely descriptive, together with personal names and geographical
terms, were denominated trade names and, hence, were not registerable under
the federal trademark legislation" or protected under the common law of the
states absent development of a secondary meaning. Apart from the fact that the
term "trade name" was misleading and singularly inappropriate, since these
marks were brand names and not the name of a business, the law treated such
marks as second class citizens, only entitled to limited and inadequate
protection. There were other anomalous aspects of the common law that
deprived brands that were not technical trademarks of the protection that was
essential to prevent deception of the public and to safeguard the brands'
proprietors against the improper diversion of custom intended for them.
In my articles False and Misleading Advertising,21 Jurisdictionof the Federal
Trade Commission Over False Advertising,2 2 and Unfair Competition,23 I dealt

with the inadequacies of the common, statutory, and administrative law in
curbing false and misleading advertising and in providing adequate protection
against unfair competitive behavior.

Corrective action on these important

aspects of trademarks and unfair competition was taken by the Lanham Act,24
which permitted the registration of non-fanciful marks, personal names, and
geographical terms on proof of their acquisition of secondary meaning. Once
registered, they were to be accorded the same degree of judicial protection as
technical marks.
The Lanham Act's most significant reform was its enactment of section
43(a),25 whose original ambiguities were eliminated in subsequent revisions.
17. RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
(never adopted by the ALl).

OF TORTS

(1934);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

(Draft 1977)

18. HANDLER, BUSINESS TORTS, supra note 2.

19. Milton Handler & Charles Pickett, Trade Marks and Trade Names-Analysis and Synthesis (pts.
1 & 2), 30 COLUM. L. REV. 168, 759 (1930).
20. The Trademark Act, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724 (1905). Registration was permitted under the 1905
Act if such marks had been exclusively used for a period of 10 years before the enactment of the
statute-a privilege of scant value to marks originating after 1905.
21. 39 YALE L.J. 22 (1929).
22. 31 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1931).
23. 21 IOWA L. REV. 175 (1936).
24. ch. 540, § 43, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994)).
25. Section 43(a) provides that
[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for
goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or
false or misleading representation of fact, which (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
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Section 43(a) has been the fountainhead of a vast body of law, which now
constitutes a federal common law of trademarks and unfair competition. No
longer is it necessary to attach a state common law claim in every trademark
litigation against the possibility that the federally registered mark may be held
substantively deficient. Originally, the courts, as is customary with new
legislation, were stingy in their construction and application of the statute. But,
in due course, reason prevailed, and a potent weapon was afforded in the
unceasing war against improper business practices, some of which border on
fraud and deception. Section 43(a), in my opinion, is the most significant
advance wrought by the Lanham Act which, as other papers in this symposium
indicate, has made other notable contributions in modernizing this important
branch of the law.26
The First Restatement dealt directly with the Beech-Nut problem in a
formulation designed to balance the interests of the parties where a mark is
duplicated on other products, some related, some unrelated, or exploited in
different geographical areas.27 Judge Friendly, in the much-cited Polaroid

goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic
origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall
be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be
damaged by such act.
Id. § 43(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1994)).
26. I had the privilege of drafting section 15 of the Wheeler-Lea amendments of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, ch. 49, § 15, 52 Stat. 111, 116 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 55 (1994)).
For discussion, see Milton Handler, The Controlof False Advertising Under the Wheeler-Lea Act, 6 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 91 (Winter 1939), as well as the New York legislation on false advertising, N.Y.
Gen. Bus. Law, §§ 350, 350(a) (McKinney 1994). The offense of false advertising is defined as follows:
The term "false advertising" means advertising, including labeling, of a commodity, or
of the kind, character, terms or conditions of any employment opportunity if such
advertising is misleading in a material respect. In determining whether any advertising
is misleading, there shall be taken into account (among other things) not only
representations made by statement, word, design, device, sound or any combination
thereof, but also the extent to which the advertising fails to reveal facts material in the
light of such representations with respect to the commodity or employment to which
the advertising relates under the conditions prescribed in said advertisement, or under
such conditions as are customary or usual.
Id. § 350(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
27. The First Restatement provided that
[iln determining whether one's interest in a trade-mark or trade name is protected, under the rules stated in §§ 717 and 730, with reference to the goods, services or business
in connection with which the actor uses his designation, the following factors are important: (a) the likelihood that the actor's goods, services or business will be mistaken for
those of the other; (b) the likelihood that the other may expand his business so as to
compete with the actor; (c) the extent to which the goods or services of the actor and
those of the other have common purchasers or users; (d) the extent to which the goods
or services of the actor and those of the other are marketed through the same channels;
(e) the relation between the functions of the goods or services of the actor and those
of the other; (f) the degree of distinctiveness of the trade-mark or trade name; (g) the
degree of attention usually given to trade symbols in the purchase of goods or services
of the actor and those of the other; (h) the length of time during which the actor has
used the designation; (i) the intent of the actor in adopting and using the designation.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 731 (1934) (discussed supra in text accompanying note 17).
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case, improved on the Restatement formulation and, in his characteristically
lucid style, defined the circumstances under which a mark would be protected
when copied by other
tradesmen and used on other products or in other
29
geographical markets.
With the changes instituted by the Lanham Act and the First Restatement,
substantive trademark law was modernized and the serious deficiencies of prior
law were overcome; however, there are three areas which today present serious
problems in trademark and unfair competition law.
First, the courts have applied the Polaroid dictum in cases where the products are the same, contrary to the very opening words of the Friendly
formulation." This unnecessarily complicates the determination of infringement and leads to a mathematical and unrealistic weighing of the many
variables outlined by him. Several of these variables are singularly inapplicable
where the products are the same. For example, if there is a likelihood of
confusion and deception of the public, a registered mark, especially when it has
become uncontestable, is entitled to protection under the statute whether it is
a strong or a weak mark. I believe that infringement should continue to be
determined as it was determined at common law, as intended under the two
Restatements,31 and as required by the very wording of the Lanham Act.32
The misapplication of Polaroidweakens the protection to which the proprietor
of a registered mark is statutorily entitled.
Second, the antidilution legislation moves in the direction of making any use
of a trademark by another party taboo and thus unlawful. It proceeds on the
theory of trespass rather than fraud. The concept of dilution is useful where the
products are different. Where they are the same, a balanced law of trademarks
and unfair competition should permit the continued use by others of trademarks
that are not confusingly similar to the registered mark, even though they might

28. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961).
29. Judge Friendly wrote that
[wihere the products are different, the prior owner's chance of success is a function of many
variables: the strength of his mark, the degree of similarity between the two marks, the
proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual
confusion, and the reciprocal of the defendant's good faith in adopting its own mark, the
quality of defendant's product, and the sophistication of the buyers. Even this extensive
catalogue does not exhaust the possibilities-the court may have to take still other variables
into account.
Id. at 495 (emphasis added).
30. See id.
31. Supra note 17.
32. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
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possibly be regarded as dilutive.33 We should not treat a registered trademark
as analogically similar to a patent or copyright.
Third, recent Supreme Court decisions have held that trade-dress, product
configuration, and color, like other trade symbols, are entitled to registration
and enjoy the same substantive rights as other technical trademarks if they meet
the statutory standards of fancifulness and distinctiveness.34 I would hope that
the Court will not take the next step of satisfying the monopolistic aspirations
of the owners of such indicia of source by preventing their imitation or copying
by others, ignoring the teachings of Justices Brandeis and Holmes35 that
latecomers may share in the good will of a product but not in the good will of
the producer. Fair competition is enhanced by product simulation, while sharing
in the producers' good will is unfair competition.
The Third Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competition" is an extraordinary achievement. It is the authoritative compendium of our trademark and
unfair competition jurisprudence. Its scholarship is of the highest order, and it
represents the best thinking on the various topics it covers. It is an indispensable tool for all students, teachers, and practitioners. It is an appropriate climax
to the fascinating developments in this corner of the law that have taken place
since 1926 when I embarked on the personal voyage outlined in this essay.

33. See Milton W. Handler, Are the State Antidilution Laws Compatible with the National Protection
of Trademarks?, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 269 (1985); see also Milton Handler, Letters to the Editor, 84
TRADEMARK REP. 101 (1994). Since the submission of this paper for publication, Congress has enacted
as part of the Lanham Act, a section that prohibits the dilution of famous marks. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)
(Supp. 1996). Notwithstanding this amendment, I still believe that the addition of a federal remedy
against dilution is a mistake and that it will encourage additional litigation at a time when the courts
are already overwhelmed by the volume of cases with which they deal.
34. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S.Ct. 1300 (1995); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana
Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
35. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938); Saxlehner v. Wagner, 216 U.S.
375, 380-81 (1910); Milton Handler, Product Simulation: A Right or a Wrong?, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
1178, 1183 (1964).
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (1995).

